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1 Introduction
The Arab Spring of 2011 came as a surprise to most observers. What were once reasonably tranquil societies
exploded in anti-government protests in the span of a few weeks. Such sudden, massive changes in anti-authority
sentiment are hardly unique in history. In the 20th century alone, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917, and the fall of Iron Curtain and Soviet governments were all similarly as sudden and as
massive as the Arab Spring protests.1 The frequency with which such events occur suggests that they are
not idiosyncratic. This begs two questions: i) What are the mechanisms through which such massive changes
arise?, and ii) Are there institutional or macroeconomic conditions that encourage such changes when present
and discourage such changes when absent?
There is an extensive literature answering the rst of these questions. Granovetter (1978) was amongst the
rst to argue that cascades can arise when individuals' preferences are interconnected - if enough people take
some action it encourages others to do the same, which encourages more to do the same, and so on until a
cascade results in a vastly dierent equilibrium. Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b) proposed a related mechanism,
noting that small events can encourage individuals to publicly reveal their previously suppressed, privately held
preferences; if a threshold level of preference revelation is passed, a cascade to a new equilibrium can arise.2
These models have been employed to explain numerous phenomena, including the rapidly escalating protest
movements that arose in many Communist countries in Eastern Europe around the fall of Communism (Kuran
1991, 1995a; Lohmann 1994).3
Cascade models dier signicantly from the neo-classical view of collective action put forth by Olson (1971)
and Tullock (1971, 1987), where individuals maximize their own utility independent of others. The interconnect-
edness of preferences inherent to cascade models entails very dierent consequences from neo-classical models;
1Historically, numerous other examples abound. This is no place for a complete list, but some examples include the Taiping
Rebellion in China (1850-1864), the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381, and even the Protestant Reformation. The latter spread
anti-papal sentiment in a manner unseen in previous Christian history (as most other movements were quickly repressed). Indeed,
Rubin (2014) suggests that the mechanism proposed in the present paper played a key role in the Reformation, as the printing
press facilitated the spread of the "shock" of Luther's initial works, leading to a cascade of revolt.
2Small events can also act as a signal in the decision process, leading to social learning phenomena such as herd behavior that
encourages individuals to ignore their private information and follow the actions of others. These insights were rst spelled out
theoretically by Banerjee (1992, 1993) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) - who argued that herding could result in
inecient and fragile equilibria - and conrmed in the lab by Anderson and Holt (1997). Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer,
and Ivo Welch have organized a website, http://info-cascades.ivo-welch.info/, which provides a literature review and links, as of
2004, to articles on information cascades.
3Experimental work has given further insight into the nature of cascades. For example, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) show that
cascades can fail to emerge when predicted by theory due to limited reasoning ability. Goeree et al. (2007) show that cascades can
self-correct, leading to dierent predictions than standard models. Others have delved into the theoretical determinants of cascades.
Kuran and Sunstein (1999) argue that the availability of certain types of information - and the ability of some to manipulate which
information is available - pushes societies towards certain equilibria. Oliver et al. (1985) and Yin (1998) stress the importance
of the distributions of the production function and preferences in determining whether a revolution occurs. Watts and Dodds
(2007) argue that cascades are driven by a critical mass of easily inuenced people, and Macy (1991) argues that protest thresholds
are endogenous. Oliver (1993) provides an overview of the sociological advances made in this literature in the 1980s and early
1990s. The present paper abstracts from these points by presenting a model with parsimonious and non-controversial assumptions
regarding distributions, player types, and preference exogeneity.
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the latter indicate that collective action is dicult to sustain in large groups, whereas it follows from the former
that large-scale collective action can occur even in the absence of supporting organizations. The fact that the
historical record points to numerous instances of large-scale collective action suggests that the cascade literature
oers insight where the neo-classical model fails.
Yet, despite the existence of such an extensive literature on cascades, there is precious little theory addressing
the second question asked in the opening paragraph: Are there institutional or macroeconomic conditions that
facilitate the formation of cascades when present and discourage their formation when absent?4 The works
which do study such institutional conditions focus primarily on the role that social or political sanctions play in
suppressing private opposition to a regime (Kuran 1989, 1995a; Lohmann 1994; Rasler 1996; Slater 2009). By
merely focusing on the political structures in which such phenomena arise, it is possible to overlook the general
microeconomic settings under which these behaviors are facilitated.
This paper aims to ll this hole in the literature. To this end, I formulate a general model which applies to
all types of sanctioning authority (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). The model's insights extend
on the works cited above, suggesting that cascades which induce massive economic, social, or political changes
may be a consequence of an institutional arrangement in which one type of authority has multilateral coercive
power - that is, the ability to aect sanctions over numerous dimensions (religious, social, economic, etc.). I
call this authority a central authority, with the degree of centralization increasing in the authority's (implicit)
ability to impose multiple sanctions on the citizenry.5 On one extreme, a fully centralized regime is akin to
a totalitarian system, where the ruler has total domination over all aspects of life (Arendt 1951). The other
extreme is a well-functioning democracy, where rulers are subject to a variety of checks and balances and have
little authority over most parts of one's life. The model analyzes both of these extremes - which rarely exist in
their purest form in the real world - as well as departures from either extreme and the resulting consequences
thereof.6
Specically, the model analyzes the interactions between citizens and institutional authorities under the
situation where their preferences are not aligned. Citizens derive intrinsic utility from their own actions and
have sanctions imposed on them for publicly rejecting (i.e., protesting) the actions of the two institutional
4Ellis and Fender (2011) consider the role that information cascades play in revolutionary regime transition, but they model the
two phenomena separately instead of integrating the two. Callander (2007) shows how bandwagons can arise in sequential voting
schemes, such as U.S. presidential primaries, but does not explore more general institutional conditions.
5Throughout this paper, I use the term "centralized" to indicate the degree to which coercive power over sanctions aecting
dierent aspects of one's life (e.g., political, religious, social) is concentrated in one authority. This is similar to the structure
recently proposed by Slater (2009), who looks at the role that the separation between political elites and communal/religious elites
plays in revolution mobilization. This is a broader denition than ones normally used in the political science and political economy
literature, which frequently focus on federalism, administrative centralization, scal centralization, or democratic centralization (for
example, see Rondinelli [1981] or Manor [1999]). Any of these forms of centralization t into the model espoused in this paper,
although my focus is the costs imposed by authorities, not the institutional structures themselves.
6I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that the model is akin to a perfect competition model; while it rarely exists in
the real world, it provides a nice framework for analyzing departures from the extreme case.
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authorities. These actions could represent any number of phenomena in which the desires of some citizens
diverge from those of institutional authorities, such as speaking or writing freely, having more than one child, or
practicing a minority religion. Citizens' utilities are also interdependent with other citizens (as in Granovetter
1978; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Kuran 1995; Kim and Bearman
1997; Siegel 2009). That is, citizens derive disutility when their actions dier from endogenously determined
social norms.7
The model's dynamics entail that there are two equilibria of concern (as in Granovetter 1978 and Kuran
1995a): a low protest equilibrium and a massive protest equilibrium.8 The model's primary insight is that
the size of the shock necessary to jump from one equilibrium to the other is a function of the type of regime.
More specically, the model suggests that highly-centralized authorities are more insulated from pressures for
change when exogenous shocks are small. There is less incentive for citizens to violate the dictates of highly-
centralized authorities, as they incur more than one type of sanction from doing so. Consequently, the tipping
point of the cascade is not reached, and those who privately share feelings of opposition to the authority do
not protest (and implicitly punish those who do). As a result, the low protest equilibrium is more likely to
remain after a small shock.
Yet, since citizens in a highly-centralized regime are more likely to stay silent (i.e., not protest), massive
changes are more likely to result (relative to decentralized regimes) when a suciently large shock occurs. When
a small portion of society transgresses the law (or norm, or custom, etc.), a cascade to a vastly new equilibrium
arises; the actions of these citizens encourage more citizens to transgress the law, which encourages even more to
evade the law, and so on. This occurs to a lesser extent when authority is decentralized, as authorities are more
likely to accommodate the actions of the citizenry, and preferences are therefore less likely to be falsied prior
to the shock. Hence institutional authorities with centralized, multi-lateral coercive power may seem insulated
from upheaval when in fact they are quite vulnerable.9
7These norms may arise from the importance individuals place on social identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005), social custom
and reputation (Akerlof 1980; Romer 1984; Kuran 1989, 1998; Naylor 1990; Gould 1993; Kuran and Sunstein 1999), or status and
conformity (Fershtman and Weiss 1993; Bernheim 1994; Fershtman, Murphy, and Weiss 1996; Akerlof 1997; Kuran and Sandholm
2008).
8The term massive protest could be seen as synonymous with revolution, although the aim of this paper is to shed light on
any type of massive and rapid equilibrium change. Yet, this paper does relate to the large economic, sociological, and political
science literature in revolutions. The mechanism underlying revolutionary activity in the present paper is closest to Kuran (1989,
1995a, 1995b), who analyzes the implications of public revelations of private preferences. The present paper is not meant to accept
or deny the validity of any of the arguments in the revolutions literature, but instead oers a complementary hypothesis. I do not
account for the organizations or leadership that are often instrumental to revolutionary activity (or even civil war, as in Besley and
Persson [2011]), but instead provide a mapping from broad institutional structure to massive social, political, and economic change.
For overviews of the social analysis of revolutions, see Tanter and Midlarsky (1967), Shugart (1989), and Goldstone (1994, 2001).
9An additional implication of the model is that ineciencies are less likely to be addressed in centralized societies, since central
authorities do not have to compete with other authorities for constituents and revenue, and they are better able to suppress dissent
resulting from government ineciencies. Indeed, Hayek (1979) notes that the monopoly of the provision of government services held
by centralized governments causes economic ineciencies and restrictions of freedom that would not be found if more decentralized
entities were forced to compete for constituents. With respect to the model presented here, the upshot is that highly-centralized
authorities are eventually likely to disappoint their constituents, possibly resulting in a cascade. I do not consider this potentially
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A familiar illustration of these dynamics has transpired in Korea since its partition in 1945. North Korea
became one of the most highly centralized regimes in the world (per the denition used in this paper), as
sanctioning power of all types was ostensibly held by the Supreme Leader (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and
Kim Jong-un). Meanwhile, South Korea is signicantly more decentralized, and there is consequently much
more political conict (as is the case with most democracies). The conict in South Korea has led to numerous
marginal changes - particularly, expanded freedoms and democratization - as dierent ideologies and preferences
rose and fell in popularity with the population. The North Korean government has been able to prevent such
marginal changes from arising. However, an implication of the model is that if the North Korean regime
eventually cracks, the institutional changes will be far larger than anything that has ever occurred in South
Korea.10 The same could be said about the the Communist Party in China, Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe,
and the autocratic Arab dictators (e.g., Mubarak, Qadda) who faced major protests in the Arab Spring of
2011 (although none of these states are as centralized as North Korea).11
Although the examples listed above are all of repressive regimes, this is only one way in which the centraliza-
tion of coercive power is manifested. That is, repressive regimes - most of whom derive their ability to repress
through a stranglehold on the military - are a mere subset of the centralized regimes considered in the model. An
important example of a dierent type of regime to which the model applies is theocracy, where authorities have
inuence over religious sanctions. A contemporary example of such a polity is Iran, where political, economic,
and religious power is centralized in the religious establishment. It is costly for political or economic leaders
to openly violate the dictates of religious authorities, which implicitly gives the religious authorities power over
numerous types of sanctions. The model indicates that if a large shock ever occurs in Iran (perhaps a sharp
and unexpected drop in the price of oil), a massive institutional change may result.
In Section 3 of this paper, I provide an empirical test of the model by analyzing the numerous austerity
protests which occurred in the developing world since the 1970s. These protests provide a nice setting in
which to test the implications of the model, since they were unexpected, varied in severity, generally occurred
after a specic type of shock (IMF conditionality), and occurred in dierent types of regimes (centralized and
decentralized). An econometric analysis of these protests from 1976-1992 is consistent with the implications of
endogenous nature of the shock in the model, however, as doing so would complicate the model without yielding much additional
insight, since the results would merely be exacerbated.
10I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out how well the Korean example ts the intuition espoused in the model. The
most obvious examples are of political institutions in unstable countries, but the mechanisms of the model can also apply within
stable countries. Although these countries generally do not have "centralized" governments in the context employed in this paper
(i.e., control over numerous aspects of one's life), there are generally lower-level institutions in these countries to which the model
applies. For example, religious sects often control numerous aspects of members' lives and thus help shape their publicly-expressed
opinions. The model suggests that the long-run vitality of these groups will be undermined if leaders express opinions which are
too far out of line with members' privately held opinions (e.g., on gay marriage or abortion).
11Indeed, none of the Arab Spring states fully controlled the religious establishment, which left an important lever of control
out of their hands. Likewise, a certain level of decentralization of economic institutions has occurred in China over recent decades.
Despite the government's attempts to censor inammatory material, the spread of the internet and social networking websites like
Weibo has made complete centralization nearly impossible.
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the model. The main result is that protests were more severe under decentralized authorities if they followed
small shocks, but were more severe under centralized authorities if they followed large shocks.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a T period game, for some large T , with perfect information. There are M + 2 players (where M is
large): M heterogeneous citizens and two institutional (social, political, economic, legal, or religious) authorities
- a central authority (C) and a non-central authority (N).12 An example of such a setting is a dictatorship
where the central authority is the dictator and the non-central authority is a tribal leader, religious leader,
major landowner, celebrity, judge, local political ocial, or anyone else whose actions inuence the utility of
the citizens yet are themselves subject to the actions of the dictator.
The institutional authorities choose from a continuous set of actions which the citizens can publicly accept
or reject. The model analyzes situations in which the preferences of some citizens exogenously dier from those
of the authorities, so actions could represent varying levels of freedom of speech, press, or religion, publicly
expressed dissatisfaction with the government or religious authorities, or public opinion on social issues. The
questions that the model sheds light on are, "Under what conditions do small shocks lead to a massive increase
in protest by citizens?" and "How is the severity of protest aected by the centralization of authority?"
In the rst period, the central authority chooses an action aC ∈ [0, 1]. In the second period, the non-
central authority chooses an action aN ∈ [0, 1]. From periods 3 to T , citizens choose whether to publicly
accept (aj = 0) or reject (aj = 1) C's action. They make this decision once in each period and they do so
simultaneously. Citizens are not bound to make the same decision in every period. A citizen who chooses to
reject (aj = 1) in period τ may choose to accept (aj = 0) in period τ + 1.
In some period t̄ ∈ (3, T2 )), an exogenous shock is realized where fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of those choosing aj = 0
in period t̄− 1 are encouraged to choose aj = 1 in period t̄. Meanwhile, all other citizens simultaneously choose
to accept or reject C in period t̄. The game continues as before until actions are chosen in the nal period T .
The shock can be interpreted as an unexpected and unforeseen event which momentarily reduces the per-
ceived costs or increases the benets of publicly rejecting C. Historical examples of such a shock include the
self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi (which ignited the Arab Spring of 2011), Martin Luther nailing the 95
Theses to the door of a Wittenberg church (sparking the Protestant Reformation), or the failed attempt of royal
ocial to collect poll taxes sparking the English Peasant's Revolt of 1381. In all of these (and many other)
cases, the shock aected only part of the population, who publicly displayed their displeasure simply because
12The inclusion of only two authorities allows for tractability. The intuition underlying the main results of the model holds in
more realistic situations including numerous types of authorities.
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they were displeased, not because they intended to ignite a cascade. The changes resulting from these shocks
were only later transmitted to the rest of the population (through mechanisms highlighted in this model).13
Each citizen j derives utility from choosing actions, aj ∈ {0, 1}, where the citizen publicly accepts C's
dictates if aj = 0 and rejects them if aj = 1. Citizens derive greater utility from rejecting C's dictates when
their own intrinsic "bliss point", bj , is further away from zero.
14 Each citizen is randomly assigned a bliss point
from a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.15 The citizens' utilities are interdependent; that is,
they derive more utility by choosing actions that others choose.16 Citizens observe how many other citizens
rejected C (chose aj = 1) in the previous period, and they derive utility by acting in a manner similar to how
others acted in the previous period. This underscores the idea that attending a protest is much more enticing
if many others have protested in the past, but one does not know how large a protest will be in the present.
If the citizens choose to publicly reject the authorities' dictates, they also incur costs which are a function of
the actions of the institutional authorities, aC and aN . These costs are increasing in the size of the violation (as
in Romer [1984], Iannaccone [1988], Bernheim [1994], Kuran [1987, 1995a], Akerlof [1997], Kuran and Sandholm
[2008]) and represent the costs (or punishments) associated with publicly breaking a religious dictate, breaking
a law, violating a political norm, and the like, depending on the type of authority in question.
Citizen j's preferences in period t are described in each period by the following utility function:
Uj,t = I {aj,t = 0}
[
−m1 (aj,t − bj)2 +m2 1M−1
∑
I {ai,t−1 = 0}
]
+
I {aj,t = 1}
[
−m1 (aj,t − bj)2 +m2 1M−1
∑
I {ai,t−1 = 1} −m3
(
aj,t − aN
)
−m4
(
aj,t − aC
)] , (1)
where m1, m2, m3, and m4 are weighting parameters greater than zero and I {·} is an indicator function.
The non-central authority, N , is not directly aected by the actions of the citizenry - citizens revolt against
C, not N . Instead, N weighs the intrinsic benets of its action against the costs that C can impose for choosing
actions contrary to C's desires. N can therefore be thought of as a legitimizing agent of C (e.g., a religious
13The literature on revolutions provides numerous other types of shocks that could precipitate revolutions, such as sharp
reversals in economic fortunes (Davies 1962; Tanter and Midlarsky 1967), rapid economic growth (Olson 1963), defeat in war, or
sustained population growth (Goldstone 2001). In some cases, the type of policies taken by centralized governments exacerbate
shocks to a greater extent than non-centralized governments (for a recent example, see Meng, Qian, and Yared [2010]; for more on
centralization and distribution of public goods, see Lockwood [2002], Besley and Coate [2003], and Faguet [2004]). Where this is
the case, the implications of the model for centralized governments are even greater.
14I assume that citizens derive no additional utility from a "successful" revolt (i.e., one where many citizens choose aj = 1), as
in Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011). Incorporating this into the model would merely exacerbate the incidence of cascades, since it
would lower the protest threshold level of each citizen.
15Normality is not a necessary feature of the analysis. Any type of distribution with two inection points provides similar results.
If there is a rightward skew in the distribution (which is to be expected, since there is a fatter tail of citizens in opposition to the
central authority in most oppressive regimes), then the results hold over a larger portion of the parameter space than is considered
in this paper.
16Interdependence captures the inuence of social norms which may arise from the importance individuals place on social iden-
tity, social custom, reputation, status, or conformity. This specication assumes that individuals derive utility from conforming.
Gintis (2003) suggests that "pro-social" behavior may be biologically determined, as humans improved their biological "tness" by
internalizing cultural norms. Also see Greif (2010) and Greif and Tadelis (2010).
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authority legitimizing an autocrat or a legal authority legitimizing elected ocials).17
For simplicity, I assume that the actions of the citizenry do not enter N 's utility function. While N 's actions
do aect the citizenry, and the citizens' actions indirectly aect N 's utility (through their eect on C), this
assumption is justied if we consider the cost imposed by C as the salient one aecting N 's actions. N derives
utility from choosing actions close to its intrinsic bliss point, bN ∈ (0, µ), and it faces a cost from choosing actions
which dier from the central authority, C. The upper bound µ indicates that it has a stronger preference for
no protests occurring than the average citizen. N 's preferences can be described as follows:
UNt = −n1
(
bN − aN
)2 − γ (aN − aC)2 , (2)
where n1 is a weighting parameter greater than zero. γ ≥ 0 is the primary exogenous parameter of concern
in the model. It denotes the degree to which the non-central authority incurs a cost from diverging from the
action of the central authority.18 Although there are certainly endogenous elements to γ in reality - the degree
to which one authority incurs costs from diverging from the other could be a function of the degree to which the
citizens abide by its dictates - endogenizing this key variable unnecessarily complicates the model. This paper
concentrates on massive equilibrium changes over a short period and how such changes arise rapidly. Broader
institutional changes which endogenously eect the level of centralization may follow in the long run due to the
interactions described in the model, but should not be aected in the short run by the rapid, massive change
which is at the heart of this model.19
The centralization parameter enters N 's utility as a scalar which aects the cost N incurs for choosing an
action dierent from C. At γ = 0, there is no such cost, at γ →∞ there is an innite cost (if aN 6= aC), and at
γ ∈ (0,∞) there is a positive cost that is increasing in γ. While it is possible (in reality, but not in the model)
that C may also face costs from not conforming to N , the assumption of unidirectional centralization of coercive
power allows for tractability.20 It follows from this setup that at γ →∞, the two authorities are ostensibly the
same actor: power over numerous dimensions is centralized in one authority (C). This extreme case is similar
to Arendt's (1951) vision of totalitarianism, where rulers have total domination of all aspects of life. At large
γ less than innity, C has signicant but not unlimited power over varying types of sanctions.
The central authority, C, derives utility from choosing actions close to its bliss point, bC ∈
(
0, bN
)
. The
upper bound bN indicates that it has a stronger preference for no protests occurring than N . C wishes to
17For more on the economic eects of legitimizing agents, see Co³gel, Miceli, and Rubin (2012).
18For more on the centralization of coercive power, see Greif (2005) and Karaman (2009).
19Moreover, Rubin (2011) shows in a similar model that under a basic set of circumstances, endogenizing the degree of central-
ization merely exacerbates the eects seen under an exogenous parametrization, as the feedback between players is more enhanced.
20In fact, the model can be interpreted as one of relative centralization, where γ is the cost incurred by N for not following C's
actions relative to the reverse situation (where C incurs costs). All that is needed for the results to hold is for N to have a greater
cost than C.
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minimize the average number of citizens who reject its dictates in period T .21 This specication reects the
idea that the central authority wants to minimize the scale of public rejection of its policy.22 C's preferences
can be described as follows:
UC = −c1
(
aC − bC
)2 − 1
M
∑
I {ai,T = 1} , (3)
where c1 is a weighting parameter greater than zero.
2.2 Solving the Model
2.2.1 Equilibrium Actions: Citizens and N
The model is solved using the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept, so I proceed using backwards induction.
Equilibrium actions are denoted with superscript *.
I rst solve for the equilibrium actions of the citizenry in periods 3 through T . A little algebra applied to
equation (1) indicates that citizen j chooses to publicly accept C's dictates in period t (aj,t = 0) when:
bj ≤
1
2m1
m1 −m2
1− 2
M − 1
∑
i6=j
I {ai,t−1 = 0})
+m3 (1− aN∗)+m4 (1− aC∗)
 . (4)
In each period, some citizen has the largest bliss point, denoted b∗t , of all of the citizens choosing aj,t = 0. If
an interior solution exists, then citizen j chooses aj,t = 0 when (denoting F (·) as the normal cdf with mean µ
and standard deviation σ2):
bj ≤
m2
m1
F
(
b∗t−1
)
+
1
2m1
[
m1 −m2 +m3
(
1− aN∗
)
+m4
(
1− aC∗
)]
. (5)
Next, solve for the optimal action of N in period 2. Its rst-order condition provides the result:
aN∗ =
n1b
N + γaC*
n1 + γ
. (6)
Plugging (6) into (5) entails that citizen j chooses aj,t = 0 in period t when:
bj ≤
m2
m1
F
(
b∗t−1
)
+
1
2m1
[
m1 −m2 +m3
n1
(
1− bN
)
n1 + γ
+
(
m3
γ
n1 + γ
+m4
)(
1− aC∗
)]
. (7)
21This is an indirect utility specication. We could think of C's optimization problem as maximizing the probability of staying
in power while also having some optimal policy (bC). Minimizing the number of citizens choosing aj,T = 1 is tantamount to
maximizing the probability of staying in power.
22If there is a massive rejection of C's policy, it will be reected by period T . See the rest of the model for details.
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2.2.2 Stationary and Stable Equilibria
In this section, I consider stationary and stable equilibria of the game for a given level of aC∗. I start by dening
the terms stationary equilibrium and stable equilibrium.
Denition 1: An equilibrium is stationary in period t if b∗t = b
∗
t−1.
Denition 2: A stationary equilibrium is stable in period t if, after one citizen mistakenly changes actions in
period t+ 1, the same stationary equilibrium in period t exists in some period t◦ ∈ (t+ 1, T ].23
By denition, a stationary equilibrium arises when b∗t = b
∗
t−1, meaning that the same number of people choose
aj,t = 0 in period t as choose aj,t−1 = 0 in period t − 1. It follows that, if a stationary equilibrium exists in
period t, then all citizens choose the same action in every period from t to T (in the absence of a shock).
In a stationary equilibrium, all citizens with bliss points b∗t and below choose aj,t = 0 in period t, while all
citizens with bliss points greater than b∗t choose aj,t = 1. It follows that a stationary equilibrium exists when
inequality (7) is satised for all bj ≤ b∗t but is not satised for all bj > b∗t . For large M , this logic indicates that
an equilibrium is stationary in period t when:
b∗t =
m2
m1
F
(
b∗t−1
)
+
1
2m1
[
m1 −m2 +m3
n1
(
1− bN
)
n1 + γ
+
(
m3
γ
n1 + γ
+m4
)(
1− aC∗
)]
. (8)
Figure 1 maps b∗t (the highest bliss point of all citizens choosing aj,t = 0) on the horizontal axis and the
right-hand side of Equation (8) on the vertical axis (in a manner similar to Granovetter [1978] and Kuran
[1995]). This gure therefore provides insight into where a stationary equilibrium occurs: wherever the curve
crosses the 45-degree line, the left-hand side and right-hand side of Equation (8) are equal and hence represent
a stationary equilibrium.
The curve takes on the familiar S-shape because the distribution of bliss points is normally distributed, and
the cumulative density function, F (·), is found in the right-hand side of Equation (8). Normality means that
F (·) increases slowly for low values of b∗ (at the left tail of the pdf), rises rapidly near the inection point of
F (·) (which is located at the mean bliss point), and then tapers o as b∗ increases (the right tail of the pdf).
The S-shaped curve in Figure 1 has many important features. Most importantly, it indicates the possibility
that multiple stationary equilibria exist. When the curve crosses the 45-degree line more than once - which is
possible only when the slope of the curve is greater than one at its inection point (bliss point µ) - multiple
stationary equilibria exist. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that the three stationary equilibria (E1, E2, and E3) have
23Citizens cannot make mistakes in the model. The stable equilibrium concept is merely employed to focus our attention on
situations that are mistake-proof. The stable equilibrium concept is similar to the trembling-hand perfect concept, although it
is slightly stricter. A stable equilibrium is not trembling-hand perfect because a "mistake" by one citizen could be oset by a
"mistake" by another citizen in a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, but not in a stable equilibrium.
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dierent properties. E3 is a "good" stationary equilibrium from the central authority's perspective, since more
citizens choose aj = 0, while E1 is a "bad" stationary equilibrium.
For the remainder of the analysis, assume that multiple equilibria exist and that the pre-shock stationary
equilibrium is E3.24 That is, prior to period t̄, the citizen with bliss point b3 is the one with the highest bliss
point amongst those choosing aj,t = 0. After all, we are interested in situations where massive anti-authority
movements emerge on what were quiet streets. We can interpret E3 as the "quiet streets" equilibrium, since
most of the population publicly accepts C's dictates despite privately disagreeing with C, while we can interpret
E1 as the "massive protest" equilibrium.
E1 and E3 are stable while E2 is not. To see this, note that any point in which the curve is above the
45-degree line, such as bliss point Y in Figure 1, is one in which LHS<RHS of (8). Inequality (7) indicates that
for citizens with bliss point between Y and b3, the optimal action is aj,t = 0. Hence, the citizen with bliss point
Y cannot have the largest bliss point of all citizens choosing aj,t = 0 in a stationary equilibrium; if it chooses
aj,t = 0 in period t, citizens with bliss points between Y and b3 also have incentive to choose aj,t+1 = 0 in period
t+1. This means that at equilibrium E3, if one (or a few) citizens deviates and chooses aj,t = 1, the equilibrium
will converge back to E3 in time. Conversely, this means that at equilibrium E2, if even one citizen deviates
and chooses aj,t = 0, the equilibrium will move to E3. Likewise, at any point in which the curve is below the
45-degree line, such as bliss point X, LHS>RHS of (8). Inequality (7) indicates that at any bliss point between
b1 and X, the optimal action is aj,t = 1. A similar logic to that espoused above indicates that if one (or a few)
citizen deviates from E1 to choose aj,t = 0, the equilibrium will converge back to E1 over time. Conversely, this
means that at equilibrium E2, if even one citizen deviates and chooses aj,t = 1, the equilibrium will move to
E1 in time. This logic entails that equilibria E1 and E3 are stable. On the other hand, since it only takes one
citizen deviating from E2 for a new equilibrium to emerge, E2 is not stable.
We are interested in nding the conditions under which the shock moves the economy from stable equilibrium
E3 to stable equilibrium E1. When this occurs, the society moves from the "quiet streets" equilibrium to the
"massive protest" equilibrium. It can be seen in Figure 1 that at equilibrium E3, if all of the citizens (plus one)
with bliss points between b2 and b3 change their actions from public acceptance (aj,t = 0) to public rejection
(aj,t = 1) of the central authority, E1 will emerge as the equilibrium outcome. All of the citizens with bliss
points between b1 and b2 join the cascade to the new equilibrium. In other words, b2 is the threshold bliss point
- if citizens below bliss point b2 choose aj,t = 1, E1 will eventually emerge as a stable equilibrium, while E3 will
24Multiple equilibria can only exist when µ is not too small. If µ is too small, the S-shaped curve arches upward prior to reaching
the 45-degree line, and it crosses the 45-degree line only once (at the top of the S). A sucient set of conditions for there to exist
three equilibria are µ > m1+m3+m4
2m1
and σ < σ̄, which can be found by plugging in F (µ) = 0.5, γ →∞, and aC∗ = 0 into equation
(8) (the values for γ and aC∗ are chosen to provide sucient conditions). When µ satises this condition, the S-shaped curve
intersects the 45-degree line at E1, and there must exist some σ̄ so that the curve also intersects the 45-degree line at E2 and E3
for all σ < σ̄ (since a smaller value of σ indicates a steeper S-shaped curve around the mean).
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re-emerge if citizens above b2 choose aj,t = 0.
Within the context of the model, this means that the shock may not end up aecting equilibrium actions at
all. If the pre-shock equilibrium is E3 and β < F (b3)−F (b2), then not enough citizens publicly disapprove after
the shock (i.e., choose aj,t = 1) to eventually move the equilibrium to E1. Instead, the equilibrium eventually
moves back to E3, and all those who were aected by the shock go back to publicly accepting C's dictates
(aj,t = 0). This is tantamount to some people taking to the streets following a shock, but upon doing so realize
that public support for their cause is trivial, and they eventually go back inside and publicly abide by C's
dictates. On the other hand, when the shock is suciently large (β > F (b3) − F (b2)), the initial equilibrium
unravels and the post-shock equilibrium is E1. In this case, enough people take to the streets after the shock
that more people are encouraged to do so (since preferences are interconnected), which encourages more to do
so, and so on until 1− F (b1) portion of the citizens publicly reject C.
2.2.3 Cascades and Centralization
In the model, there are two ways in which an economy can move from stable equilibrium E3 to E1 after a
shock. First, if nearly all citizens are aected by the shock (β is large), then most citizens publicly protest and
eventually E1 arises. This is a trivial result - it merely indicates that a large shock which encourages nearly
everyone to change actions will change the equilibrium outcome. The second manner in which an economy
moves from E3 to E1 is less obvious. It occurs when cascades of public dissent encourage individuals to reveal
their preferences (in period t) after seeing others do so (in period t − 1). Cascades can arise when a small
portion of the population is aected by the shock because the interconnectedness of preferences spreads the
shock to much of the population. I focus on these outcomes for the rest of the paper; that is, I focus on cases of
preference revelation rather than preference change. After all, it is under these conditions that seemingly quiet
streets can erupt in protest after relatively small events trigger the spread of dissent.25
I ignore the possibility that one citizen, knowing that they are the threshold citizen, triggers a movement
from E3 to E1.26 Instead, I focus on the case where any one citizen or group of citizens is willing to publicly
display their anti-authority preferences even if no one follows. A recent and vivid example of such an action
was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor whose very public actions helped
spark the Arab Spring of 2011. He undoubtedly could not have foreseen the eect that his actions would have;
25Of course, in reality both preference change and preference revelation occur simultaneously. I focus on preference revelation
because changes resulting purely from preference changes are trivial (i.e., large preference changes leading to large changes in
equilibrium outcomes is not a novel insight).
26This makes sense under any number of realistic assumptions on cognition and population size (M). This assumption merely
implies that even if citizens have full information on the distribution of types (which is extremely unlikely in reality), they do not
have the cognitive ability to calculate b∗. This assumption is made to allow the model to address the more realistic situation where
a group of protestors creates a movement from E3 to E1, not an individual protestor. Indeed, how likely is it that anyone would
actually believe "if I protest, this movement will change from 25 people to 2,500 people"?
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he was simply fed up with government conscations of his wares. Hence, the model focuses on decentralized
equilibrium changes, not those intentionally triggered by individuals or organizations (if this is even possible).
It also diers a bit from other models of cascades (e.g., Granovetter 1978; Lohmann 1994; Kuran 1995; Ellis
and Fender 2011) in which people extract information from the previous, public actions of others. In those
models, people infer something about other people's preferences by their actions, which in turn augments their
own preferences and can lead to an information cascade. The present model is simpler (and more mechanical),
assuming that people simply respond to the publicly-expressed actions of others (perhaps due to social identity,
reputation, or conformity; see footnote 7 for citations). Indeed, introducing information extraction into the
model would exacerbate its results, since information is all the more repressed in centralized regimes (and
hence, the information revelation mechanism is more eective in triggering a cascade).
In order to focus on cascades of preference revelation, I dene a cascade as occurring when more people who
are not directly aected by the shock switch actions (from public acceptance to rejection) than those who are
directly aected by the shock. Using the nomenclature from Figure 1, I formally dene a cascade as follows:
Denition 3: A cascade occurs if both of the following conditions hold:
1. F (b3) − F (b2) < β: More than the threshold number of citizens change their actions after the shock,
entailing that the stable equilibrium changes from E3 to E1.
2. F (b3)−F (b2) < F (b2)−F (b1): The shock directly aects less than half of the citizens (who change their
actions after the shock) but still precipitates an equilibrium change from E3 to E1.
The main purpose of the model is to highlight the relationship between centralization and cascades. To this
end, note from (8) that changes in the centralization parameter (γ) or the central authority's action (aC∗)
merely shift the curve in Figure 1. The curve shifts down as aC∗ increases and shifts up as γ increases (since
aC∗ < bN ).27 Hence, the rst question that the model answers is "under which conditions (with respect to γ)
does a 'good' equilibrium (E3) emerge after the shock?"
Consider the following intuition. In high-γ economies, citizens falsify their preferences to a greater extent.
Hence, fewer citizens publicly reject C (choose aj,t = 1) since preferences are interconnected. This entails that
the bliss point of the "threshold citizen" (b2 in Figure 1) is further away from b3 as γ increases, and a greater
shock is necessary to pass the threshold. Therefore, the range of shock sizes (β) over which the economy returns
to the pre-shock stable equilibrium (E3) at some point after the shock is weakly increasing in centralization (γ),
as noted in Proposition 1.
27Since it is assumed that there are 3 equilibria for all values of aC∗, the analysis does not focus on C's decision. C simply
chooses some aC∗ to balance the marginal deviation from its bliss point with the marginal increase in citizens choosing aj,t = 0.
C's choice is monotonic in γ, so we do not need to explicitly solve for it to attain comparative statics.
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Proposition 1: The parameter space over which the pre-shock stable equilibrium (E3) eventually re-emerges
after the shock is weakly increasing in γ, ceteris paribus.
This result indicates that highly centralized economies are more insulated against public rejection of the central
authority. However, in the event that a shock does trigger a cascade, it is worth asking: how severe is the
change in the stable equilibrium actions after the shock? The following denition is useful in formalizing this
analysis:
Denition 4: The cascade magnitude is the number of citizens who change actions from publicly accepting
C in a stable equilibrium prior to the shock to publicly rejecting C in a stable equilibrium after the shock.
Cascades only arise when most citizens "disagree" with C. I focus on this case (µ > µ∗ for some µ∗ dened
in the proof of Proposition 2), which often arises in autocratic regimes when the interests of the autocrat and
the citizens are not aligned. Indeed, it is in these situations where massive equilibrium changes occur; when
a cascade occurs in a regime where the citizens disagree with the central authority, the change in expressed
preferences is much greater than in a regime where most citizens agree with the central authority.
It was noted in Proposition 1 that centralized authorities are better able to suppress dissent and are thus
more insulated from small shocks. Since centralized authorities can impose multiple sanctions on dissent,
citizens are less likely to publicly reject C despite disagreeing with its dictate. This enables a situation where
citizens "falsify their preferences" to a greater degree in centralized regimes. That is, citizens under centralized
rule are more likely to disagree with C but not publicly reject C. Kuran (1995a, p. 3) denes preference
falsication as "the act of misrepresenting one's genuine wants under perceived social pressures." When citizens
falsify their preferences, they choose actions which dier from their bliss point for two reasons. First, perceived
social pressures encourage them to choose actions similar to those chosen by others. Secondly, this outcome is
exacerbated when institutional sanctions are severe (m3 and m4 are large) and the actions of the authorities
diverge from the bliss point of the citizenry.
The major upshot of increased preference falsication is that if a suciently large shock occurs (i.e., one
that is large enough that at least the threshold citizen changes actions), the cascade magnitude is larger the
more centralized the regime is. Once some citizens act closer to their internal preferences by publicly rejecting
C (choosing aj = 1), others will nd it more attractive to publicly reject C, especially since they disagreed with
C in the rst place. Since there are more citizens who privately disagree with C in centralized regimes, this
information revelation mechanism is stronger. This logic is summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If a cascade arises, the cascade magnitude is weakly increasing in γ, ceteris paribus.
When the citizens' bliss points are far away from the actions of C (µ is large, as it is in this case), larger cascades
occur under highly centralized rule following shocks. Although highly centralized authorities are more insulated
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from small shocks, citizens are relatively unhappy. This means that when a shock is large enough that some
citizens publicly reject C, the cost of publicly rejecting C decreases, encouraging more citizens to publicly reject
C, and so on. Relative to the pre-shock stable equilibrium - which may often seem tranquil - centralized regimes
are subject to massive changes in public opinion despite having the appearance of public acceptance.
2.3 Discussion: Why Seemingly Tranquil Societies Implode
The intuition formalized in Proposition 2 oers two explanations for why seemingly tranquil, centralized soci-
eties can quickly undergo massive changes, especially when the centralized authority promotes policies that are
detrimental to most citizens (µ diers substantially from aC). One explanation, which is also oered by Gra-
novetter (1978) and Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b), is that preference falsication encourages latent movements
in social norms to emerge after a shock. That is, an economic, political, or social shock may move equilibrium
actions by enough to encourage most citizens, even those who are not directly aected by the shock, to choose
drastically dierent actions.
The other explanation, which is novel to this paper, sheds light on the role that institutional structures
play in determining the eects of shocks. It suggests that a high degree of centralization discourages marginal
changes to equilibrium actions after small shocks. Citizens have less incentive to publicly dissent, as they incur
multiple institutional costs from doing so. The same citizens may be more encouraged to publicly dissent in
less centralized societies, however, as they face less cost from doing so. This is why, as Proposition 1 notes,
stable equilibria where there is little public dissent (E3) are more likely to re-emerge over time in highly
centralized economies following a shock. Yet, when larger shocks materialize, large cascades towards vastly
dierent equilibria are more likely to result in highly centralized economies. This occurs because citizens falsify
their preferences to a greater extent in such economies, and thus large shocks encourage some citizens to change
their actions, in turn making it more likely that the institutional laws will be much dierent in the post-shock
equilibrium.
Kuran (1995a, 1995b) and Yin (1998) do suggest that unanticipated regime change is more likely to occur in
politically repressive countries. Their hypotheses coincide with the one made in the present paper, though it is
not clear that their hypotheses hold when other types of freedoms (religious, economic, legal) exist in politically
repressive regimes. The essential dierence between the present hypothesis and Kuran's and Yin's is that I
stress the interdependence of institutions that are able to impose dierent types of sanctions. This leads to a
similar conclusion as Kuran and Yin, as such institutional structures are often found in politically repressive
regimes.
The model also provides insight for how central authorities can attempt to quash massive protest movements
before a cascade arises, although such strategic considerations are not explicitly modeled. While a typical
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response of autocrats is to capture and execute the leaders of a protest movement, the model suggests that an
alternative strategy is to destroy a slice of the distribution of the citizenry, and this slice does not even need to
be the most extreme slice.28 By jailing or executing a suciently large slice of the population, the authority can
break the chain of the cascade and prevent the good equilibrium (E3) from completely unraveling. In reality,
this can be very dicult for a central authority to accomplish, in large part because he has little information
on where people fall in the distribution of preferences. Instead, a more appealing (and less costly) mechanism
often employed by central authorities is to suppress information - both about the shock and about the ensuing
public disapproval. This can explain, for example, the extreme measures taken to suppress the internet in Iran
and China.29 Such tactics work well to suppress small shocks. However, this also works to further push the
actions of the citizenry away from their intrinsic preferences, which may eventually cause a larger cascade and
thus unintentionally sow the seeds of the authority's demise.
In sum, the following testable predictions arise from this framework:
• Stable equilibria where little public dissent exists are more likely to arise in highly centralized economies.
• If a shock is large enough to cause a cascade, the change in pre- and post-shock stable equilibrium actions
is greater the greater the degree of centralization.
3 Austerity Riots and Centralization
A primary implication of the model is that countries with centralized authorities are more insulated from
change when shocks are small but are more susceptible to sudden, massive changes when shocks are large.
In this section, I test this implication by analyzing the severity of austerity protests in the developing world
between 1976 and 1992. Such protests were common in the developing world beginning in the mid-1970s in
reaction to measures employed - almost always as a condition of IMF aid - to combat ination and government
debt.30 I test the relationship between a series of IMF pressure variables and severity of protests over diering
degrees of institutional centralization to shed light on the relationships espoused in the model. Although the
data cannot speak to the microeconomic mechanisms highlighted in the model (namely, those related to internal
and expressed preferences and cascades), it can shed light on the connections between macroeconomic events,
institutional structures, and changes in publicly expressed opinions. This analysis underscores the determinants
of protest severity (a macro concept) as well as sudden equilibrium changes (a micro concept), since the latter
28I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this implication of the model.
29Makowsky and Rubin (2013) employ an agent-based model to analyze the eects of institutional centralization and information
and communication technology (ICT) on protest thresholds. They nd that the two are complements - societies with centralized
institutions are more likely to experience revolutions when ICT is widely available.
30The evolution of IMF conditionality, as well as arguments for and against conditionality, are summarized in Dreher (2004,
2009).
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is realized in the former.
Modern austerity protests began in the mid-1970s, with the rst one occurring in Peru in 1976. The protests
were sparked by austerity measures which were almost always imposed by the IMF as a condition of assistance.
Thus, unlike previous price and food riots that occurred from time to time in world history, these protests
were targeted at internationally prescribed policies increasingly imposed by the IMF beginning in the mid-
1970s.31 The stated aims of these measures were freeing up markets and cutting government spending in order
to reduce government debt and curb massive ination. These market-based measures, known by some as shock
treatment, included currency devaluation, broad reduction of spending on the public sector, privatization of
state-owned corporations, cuts in public subsidies for food and basic necessities, wage restraints, higher interest
rates, and elimination of protectionism (Walton and Seddon 1994).32
These policies sparked protests in many places where they were imposed. Such protests were dened by
Walton and Seddon (1994) as "large scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes,
and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization implemented in response
to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies." The international agency most associated
with these protests is the IMF, and hence Joseph Stiglitz called them IMF riots.
The shock treatment imposed by IMF conditionality presents a shock akin to the one described in
the model. These were not slowly implemented policy adjustments that the public anticipated for a long
time. Instead, Walton and Seddon (1994) describe them as drastic, overnight price hikes resulting from the
termination of public subsidies on basic goods and services, proclaimed by the government as regrettably
necessary reforms urged by the IMF and international lenders as conditions for new and renegotiated loans.
These shocks generally occurred rapidly enough that, in terms of the model, the fraction of citizens protesting
before the shock, F
(
b∗t̄−1
)
, was not endogenous to the shock itself. Instead, a number of citizens, likely those
most harmed by the shock, incurred a temporary adjustment of their preferences, and in some cases this
adjustment was large enough to encourage them to protest.33
The distributional implications of these policies are clear - most policies negatively aected the urban poor,
at least in the short run (Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 1994). The protests were primarily urban
in nature, often following a rise in a price for a specic good or an elimination of a subsidy. In some cases,
the protests were relegated to one city and remained non-violent, such as organized strikes planned in Ecuador
and Bolivia (Walton and Ragin 1990). On the other extreme, protests turned into deadly riots which spread
throughout the country, as was the case of the Venezuelan protest of 1989, where a week of rioting spread from
31Indeed, the extended facility fund, which was established to assist debtor nations, was formed in 1974. This helps explain why
there were no austerity protests of this nature prior to the mid-1970s.
32For a scathing review of these policies in the developing world over the last half-century, see Klein (2007).
33In other words, the shocks generally occurred rapidly enough that the curve in Figure 1 did not shift, since the right-hand side
of equation (8) is unaltered. The left-hand side of equation (8) does change, however, resulting in a movement along the curve.
16
Caracas to 16 other cities.
What determined the dierences in severity of these protests? This topic has received some attention from
sociologists and political scientists, who have proposed a wide range of explanations. Walton and Seddon (1994)
and Walton and Ragin (1990) provide evidence that over-urbanization (that is, a high level of urbanization
relative to the level of economic development) plays a key role in both the presence and severity of the riots.34
They suggest that the linkage between the two lies in the development of organizational infrastructure capable
of mobilizing political action. Walton and Ragin (1990) also suggest that IMF pressure signicantly aected
protest severity but ination and debt did not.35
In this section, I analyze how changes in IMF involvement aected the likelihood of severe protest in a
country. When IMF pressure is present, pressures to liberalize markets generally ensue and protests may follow.
Propositions 1 and 2 of the model suggest that since austerity measures dier substantially from the bliss
point of most citizens (µ is much dierent that aC), when IMF pressure (the shock in the model) is small,
centralized economies will better be able to suppress protests. However, signicant IMF pressure is more likely
to precipitate massive changes in centralized economies. In other words, the following prediction arises from
the model:
Prediction 1: When there is a small amount of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be less severe in
countries with more centralized institutions, all else being equal. However, when there is a large amount
of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be more severe in countries with more centralized
institutions.
3.1 Data
Data were gathered on austerity protests covering the same years as Walton and Seddon (1994): 1976-1992.
The former date denotes the onset of the rst modern austerity protest while the latter represents the time in
which Walton and Seddon went to press.
As noted by Walton and Ragin (1990), obtaining a complete list of debtor countries that experienced
international pressure to implement austerity measures can only be done indirectly, as the exact terms negotiated
between the IMF and debtor countries is kept secret.36 To this end, I employ three measures identied by Walton
and Ragin as indicative of IMF pressure: 1) the country employed the extended fund facility (EFF), generally
34Walton and Ragin (1990) measure over-urbanization as follows: in cross-national studies of the degree to which less developed
countries are excessively urbanized, the usual practice is to regress level of urbanization on GNP per capita and use the residuals
as a measure of overurbanization ... Large positive residuals indicate that a country is excessively urbanized relative to its level of
economic development.
35On the other hand, Auvinen (1997) nds that poor economic performance (indicated by high ination and large debt service)
is associated with political demonstrations, riots, and strikes.
36Of course, the terms will not be kept secret forever. When they are made public, a better test of the model's implications can
be conducted.
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reserved for countries suering a signicant imbalance of payments relating to structural maladjustments in
production and trade (IMF [various]), in a given year between 1976 and 1992;37 2) the country's ratio of IMF
funds used to its IMF quota exceeded 125% in a given year between 1976 and 1992; 3) the country rescheduled
or renegotiated its debt in a given year between 1976 and 1992.38 70 countries satised one of these three
criteria between 1976 and 1992.39 I form a panel that is restricted to years in which one of these criteria were
satised in the country in question within one year (either before or after). A list of these countries and the
years employed in the data is available in Appendix Table A1.
40 countries in the data experienced austerity protests between 1976 and 1992. A Lexis-Nexis search of news
reports of the 70 countries listed in Table A1 (as well as any listed in Walton and Seddon [1994] that were not
in Table A1) from 1976-1992 produced 116 separate instances of austerity protest. Protests and riots were only
documented if they resulted from austerity measures or IMF pressure - other types of anti-government protests
or strikes are not included in the data. Planned general strikes and small, non-violent, sector-specic strikes are
also not included in the data (even if they resulted from austerity measures).40
I subjectively coded each of these protests by severity using the following criterion, which are discussed
further in Appendix B. An instance was scored 1 if it were a small (relative to population), conned (to one
or two cities) protest. An instance was scored 2 if it were either prolonged but conned or widespread but not
prolonged and 3 if the protest were prolonged and contained widespread riots. An example of a protest coded
3 occurred in Algeria in October 1988, when 159 protesters were killed in a few major Algerian cities over the
span of week and thousands were injured and arrested. The government's response to the protests, including
those which lead to deaths, was not taken into account when creating the severity measures. Where government
action occurred, the index takes into account the reported events that the government was responding to, not
the government response itself. The reason for this is that it is possible that centralized governments are more
likely to respond with violence. Hence, including the government's response would bias the severity index in
favor of the proposed hypothesis.
37The IMF denes the extended fund facility as an IMF lending facility established in 1974 to assist member countries in
overcoming balance of payments problems that stem largely from structural problems and require a longer period of adjustment
than is possible under a Stand-By Arrangement. A member requesting an Extended Arrangement outlines its objectives and policies
for the whole period of the arrangement (typically three years) and presents a detailed statement each year of the policies and
measures it plans to pursue over the next 12 months. (IMF)
38Walton and Ragin split the last category into two: debt rescheduling and debt renegotiation. My reading of the data suggests
that the line between these two is often blurred, so I have lumped them together. Data for EFF and IMF quota comes from various
IMF Annual Reports; data for IMF funds used comes from the World Development Indicators database; data for debt rescheduling
and restructuring comes from clubdeparis.org, Kuhn and Guzmàn (1990), and Dillon et al. (1985).
39Some countries were omitted from the data set due to lack of IMF or control data. These include: Angola, Barbados, Burma,
Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Western Samoa, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Iran and South Korea
did not satisfy any of these conditions but are included in the data since there was an austerity protest in each country.
40All results are robust to inclusion of general strikes and industry-specic protests as severity 1 protests. These results are
available in the Appendix. General strikes are not included in the base results because the model is intended to analyze changes in
individual behavior (on a collective scale) resulting from shocks, not organized, institutionally-driven protests.
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A reading of the articles reporting on the protests showed that most protests/riots easily t into one of
these three categories. The dierences between protests coded 1 and other protests are especially stark. The
dierence between protests coded 2 and 3 are less obvious and thus more subjective, but this is not an issue in
the analysis, since protests of these two severity levels are always lumped together. I also create an alternative
index, found in Appendix B, for protests in which the severity level was not obvious. Table 1 shows the protests
data broken down by continent.41
The intuition outlined in the model indicates that a good proxy for institutional centralization is one that
accounts for one authority's ability to aect numerous types of sanctions. One such variable is spelled out in
the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2008): constraint on the executive. This variable is dened as:
The extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives,
whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any accountability
groups. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups
are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the
military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.
This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling Unlimited Authority (no regular limitations on the executive's
actions) and 7 equaling 'Executive Parity or Subordination (accountability groups have eective authority equal
to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity). This variable provides an ideal proxy for the degree
of institutional centralization, as spelled out in the model, because it measures the degree to which political
authorities can extend multifarious sanctions.
A weaker proxy of centralization is the Freedom House (2009) degree of political freedom variable. This
variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling most free and 7 equaling least free. This is hardly an ideal
measure of centralization, as dened in the model, since it does not directly underscore the ability of the central
authority to impose numerous sanctions. However, centralized authorities generally also have the ability to
restrict political freedoms. Nowhere do I claim that centralization has to be the driving force behind political
freedom; I merely suggest that this is one way in which centralization manifests itself. For these reasons,
regressions using this variable are regarded as robustness checks relative to the results employing constraint on
the executive data.
Other controls are employed to account for phenomena which political scientists, economists, and sociologists
consider as salient factors associated with protest activity. These include the urbanization rate, per capita GDP,
population, and a measure of religious fractionalization.42 The religious fractionalization index is constructed
41Table A1 shows the protest data broken down by year and Table A3 shows the data broken down by country.
42Data on urbanization, GDP, and population comes from World Bank (various). The measure of religious fractionalization is
derived from data found in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001). The controls employed in these regressions are consistent with
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like a Herndahl index, equaling the sum of the proportion of each religion in the country squared. The summary
statistics of all controls are reported in Appendix Table A4.
3.2 Analysis
3.2.1 Testing for the Presence of Protest
The data provide a chance to test the model's primary prediction: countries with centralized political authorities
should have smaller changes (relative to countries with decentralized authorities) in expressed public opinion (as
seen in protests) when shocks are small, but larger changes when shocks are large. Yet, before we can test how
shocks (proxied with IMF variables) aect the severity of protests, we must establish whether the proxies are
good predictors of protest. In particular, the model suggests testing the following equation, where Protestit is a
dummy equaling 1 if there is a protest in country i in year t, X is the set of control variables, and CP denotes
the centralization proxy, where both the constraint on the executive and political freedom variables are
transformed so that higher values indicate greater centralization. Note that regression equation (9) does not
provide a test of the model's hypothesis; instead, it provides a test of how well the IMF variables proxy for a
shock in the context of the model.
Protestit = δ0 + δ1Shockit + δ2CPit + δXit + εit. (9)
There are 3 dierent IMF variables that proxy for a shock: use of IMF funds, use of EFF funds, and
the number of restructurings and reschedulings. The rst two variables are deated by the country's IMF
quota, which is based on its standing in the world's economy. Walton and Ragin (1990) note that all three of
these variables are good predictors of austerity protests, with the number of restructurings being the strongest
predictor.43 I also create variables for the greatest single-year level of the three IMF proxies over the previous
two years.
The model indicates that the coecient on the IMF shock variable, δ1, should be positive (and statistically
signicant). If it is not, then the variable in question is not a predictor of protests in general and thus should
shed little light on how institutional centralization aects the severity of protests.
A probit model is used to test equation (9). The probit coecients are reported in Table 2.44 All regressions
those pointed out by Auvinen (1997) as ones that traditionally have received attention in the political science, economics, and
sociology literature related to political conict. Ination and government debt are not included as controls because they frequently
lead to IMF involvement.
43Walton and Ragin formulate an "IMF pressure index" which is the summation of the z-scores of all 4 IMF indicators. I do
not do this for two reasons: 1) I nd, like Walton and Ragin, that the number of restructurings and reschedulings is by far the
best predictor; 2) the sum of the z-scores is dominated by the restructuring variable, which is not normally distributed, and hence
converting it to a z-score is erroneous. I have analyzed the regressions reported in this paper using Walton and Ragin's z-score
variable and the results are similar - though not as strong - as the ones reported here. These results are available upon request.
44Table A5 reports regressions where the IMF variables are taken over two years. Results are very similar to Table 2.
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include continent dummies, and standard errors are clustered by continent.45 The results indicate that the use
of IMF funds and EFF variables are not good predictors of protests, but the restructuring/rescheduling
variable is a good predictor. The coecients on the IMF Pressure Index are statistically insignicant in all of
the regressions where use of IMF funds and EFF variables are employed as the shock proxy and all other
controls are included. However, the number of restructurings or reschedulings appears to be a strong predictor
of protests (the coecient is always positive and highly statistically signicant), a result also found in Walton
and Ragin (1990). Hence, for the remainder of the analysis I only employ reschedulings - not use of IMF funds
or EFF - as a proxy for an IMF "shock".
3.2.2 Relating Centralization and Protest Severity
Since the rescheduling variable is a good predictor of protests, we can re-write Prediction 1 as the following:
Prediction 1A: All else being equal, a change to a more centralized economy should have a positive (negative)
eect on the probability of a more severe protest occurring when the restructuring variable is large (small)
As in the model, Prediction 1A suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between centralization and
the severity of protests. This relationship can be estimated with the regression model in equation (10). The
dependent variable, ProtestSeverityit, equals one if the most severe protest in country i and year t equals 2
or 3 and equals zero otherwise. Unfortunately, there are too few observations of protests of severity 3 to test
the model using a dependent variable which equals one only if the protest is of severity 3.46 This should not
detract from the results, however, as the most signicant dierences in protest severity are between those coded
1, which are generally conned and short, and 2 and 3, which are more widespread and long in duration. As
before, CP denotes the centralization proxy (either the constraint on the executive or political rights variable),
while the shock variable is the number of reschedulings (over one or two years):47
ProtestSeverityit = η0 + η1Shockit + η2CPit + η3Shockit ∗ CPit + ηXit + εit. (10)
45Including country dummies would be ideal, but there is too little variation within countries over time for this to be a feasible
approach, as all results are dependent on a small number of observations. Using non-clustered standard errors gives largely similar
results, which are available upon request.
46Nevertheless, the results are broadly robust (in terms of statistical signicance) to an ordered probit specication.
47There is the possibility that the regressions specied above suer from an endogeneity problem. That is, it is possible that
more centralized regimes are more (or less) able to access IMF funds and impose austerity. If this is true, the shock variable
(rescheduling) is a function of the centralization proxy, and the regression model is misspecied. Moreover, Kohlscheen (2010) and
van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) nd a negative relationship between constraints on the executive power (the centralization proxy)
and sovereign debt default (which is related to IMF conditionality). However, the correlations between the shock variables and the
centralization proxies are almost 0. Amongst the observations used in the regressions, σvRESC,CE = −0.0186,σvRESC,PR = −0.0741,
where RESC is the rescheduling variable, CE is the Constraint on the Executive variable, and PR is the Political Rights variable.
Moreover, regressions with the rescheduling variables as the dependent variables and the centralization proxies and other controls
on the right-hand side provides highly insignicant results on the centralization proxy coecients. These results are available upon
request.
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Prediction 1A implies that η2 should be negative and η3 should be positive. In other words, protest severity
should be decreasing in centralization when shocks are small (and hence the interaction term is small), while
protest severity should be increasing in centralization when shocks are large. These predictions are mostly
conrmed in Table 3, which reports the probit coecients of an estimation of equation (10).48
The coecient on the centralization proxies (η2) is negative in columns (2)-(4), though it is never statistically
signicant, while the coecient on the interaction term is positive in all regressions and is statistically signicant
in columns (2)-(4). A much more instructive look is provided by Tables 4 and 5, which map the probability
of a severe protest occurring over varying amounts of reschedulings and values of the centralization parameter.
Again, the constraint on the executive has been transformed so that a value of 7 is the most centralized (least
constraint) and the value of 1 is the least centralized (most constraint). These probabilities were derived using
the coecients in Table 3, taken at the average of the control variables.49
A number of patterns emerge from these tables. First, in the lower panel of Table 4 and in both panels of
Table 5, severe protests are less likely to occur as centralization increases when there are zero reschedulings.
Although the last column suggests that this trend is not statistically signicant, this is in line with what the
model predicts: centralized regimes are more able to suppress dissent when shocks are weak or non-existent. It
is not surprising that this result is not statistically signicant - if there is no evidence of a shock, we would not
expect a severe protest to occur in any economy, centralized or not. These comparative statics reverse, however,
when reschedulings occur. In all four panels of Tables 4 and 5, the probability of severe protest is increasing in
centralization when a rescheduling occurs, with the trend being stronger when multiple reschedulings occur. This
trend is statistically signicant in 5 of the 8 specications. This result is consistent with the model: although
centralized regimes are good at suppressing small shocks, they are susceptible to massive changes when larger
shocks occur. Indeed, the probability of a severe protest occurring in the most centralized regimes is more than
double that of the least centralized regimes in 5 of the 8 specications where at least one rescheduling occurs.
In sum, this empirical exercise is meant merely to support the theoretical contribution of the model. Although
the analysis does not speak to the micro mechanisms suggested in the model, it does conrm its testable
predictions. Most importantly, it provides evidence that centralized authorities are able to suppress changes in
publicly-expressed opinion when shocks are small, but are susceptible to massive changes in publicly-expressed
opinion when shocks are large.
4894 observations are dropped in Table 3 because the Asia dummy perfectly predicts failure (i.e., protest severity =1), and thus
all Asian observations are dropped. The only protest in Asia with severity greater than one, South Korea in 1980, is not included
in the universe of observations because South Korea was never subject to IMF pressure.
49The Africa dummy is set equal to 1 and all other continent dummies set equal to 0. The results are robust to setting other
continent dummies equal to 1.
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4 Conclusion
This paper provides insight into why cascades which result in vastly dierent equilibria occur in some institu-
tional settings but not in others. Where the literature discusses the features of a society that can precipitate
a cascade, it primarily focuses on the ability of the government to sanction opposition to the regime (e.g.,
Lohmann 1994; Kuran 1995a, 1995b; Rasler 1996; Yin 1998; Slater 2009; Ellis and Fender 2011). Yet, the
literature is much less clear on whether it matters how political actors sanction opposition. Does it matter if
they can only sanction through military or police force? Are the dynamics any dierent if the regime can impose
religious, social, or economic sanctions?
This paper provides an answer to these questions. It focuses on the degree to which authorities are centralized
- that is, the degree to which they have the ability to impose sanctions on multiple parts of their subjects' lives.
This paper employs a simple economic model which suggests that authorities in centralized economies are
relatively insulated from small shocks but are susceptible to cascades resulting in massive changes if shocks are
large. The logic underlying this result is straight-forward. People living under centralized authorities are more
likely to choose actions that dier from their intrinsic optima, since they face numerous costs from publicly
stating their true beliefs. Hence, small shocks are unlikely to upset the equilibrium outcome under centralized
rule, because individuals are unwilling to incur the numerous sanctions associated with transgressing the central
authority's dictates. However, a large shock encourages some citizens to incur these costs and publicly display
their anti-authority preferences. Since centralized rule encourages most citizens to falsify their publicly-expressed
preferences, this setting is ripe for these protestors to trigger a cascade which results in a massive equilibrium
change.
In other words, the primary insight of this paper is that the size of the shock necessary to precipitate a
cascade is a function of the regime type. This insight sheds light on why cascades arise in some settings but
not in others, even if the shock which ignited the cascade is felt ubiquitously. For example, small shocks to
the world price of basic goods (e.g., food, oil) can have an impact on elections in decentralized regimes (one
need look no further than the U.S., where the prices of gasoline and groceries are often an issue in national
elections). But such small shocks are unlikely to aect political outcomes in centralized regimes, where rulers can
weather the storm by either increasing subsidies or increasing repression. The opposite is true when suciently
large shocks occur to the price of necessities. Indeed, many of the major austerity riots analyzed in Section 3
followed directly from centralized regimes removing subsidies on basic goods. Similarly large price changes in
decentralized regimes (e.g., U.S. gas prices in the late 1970s) may make many unhappy, but massive rioting is
unlikely to result.
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More generally, the model applies to numerous historical and contemporary phenomena.50 The most promi-
nent recent example is the Arab Spring of 2011, where citizens who had quietly lived under oppressive, centralized
regimes for decades revolted in massive numbers in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. Goldstone (2011)
notes that the centralization of the sanctioning ability in a Sultan (Goldstone employs the term Sultanistic
governments) was critical to these movements: Sultanistic dictators ... generally amass great wealth, which
they use to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish opponents ... Typically, the security forces are separated
into several commands (army, air force, police, intelligence) - each of which reports directly to the leader.
The leader monopolizes contact between the commands, between the military and civilians, and with foreign
governments, a practice that makes sultans essential for both coordinating the security forces and channeling
foreign aid and investment. The multi-lateral coercive power that Goldstone describes in the context of Arab
autocracies is precisely the centralized institutional condition analyzed by the model; and the Arab Spring is
a vivid example of a consequence predicted by the model of such an institutional arrangement.
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Figure 1: Three Equilibria
Table 1: Protests and Severity by Continent
Region Mild Protests (1) Moderate Protests (2) Massive Protests (3) Total Protests
Africa 9 9 3 21
Asia 10 0 1 11
Central America 16 8 1 25
Europe 7 0 2 9
Middle East 2 2 5 9
South America 17 23 1 41
Total 61 42 13 116
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Table 2: Protest Presence (Probit Coecients)
Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Use of Funds/Quota
-0.000 0.018 0.021
(0.089) (0.092) (0.091)
EFF/Quota
0.075*** 0.037 0.033
(0.027) (0.036) (0.037)
# of reschedulings/ 0.389*** 0.304*** 0.303***
restructurings (0.099) (0.108) (0.110)
Constraint on -0.020 -0.020 -0.022
Executive (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Political Rights
-0.041** -0.037 -0.041
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
Urbanization Rate
0.913 0.877 0.870 0.838 0.698 0.656
(1.153) (1.134) (1.154) (1.138) (1.025) (1.000)
Log of Real GDP
-0.188 -0.193 -0.180 -0.184 -0.180 -0.183
(0.128) (0.141) (0.122) (0.137) (0.111) (0.126)
Religious 0.656 0.630 0.648 0.622 0.600 0.568
Fractionalization (0.640) (0.644) (0.670) (0.672) (0.645) (0.654)
Log of Population
0.195** 0.193** 0.190** 0.188** 0.188** 0.185**
(0.087) (0.085) (0.084) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084)
Number of 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040** 0.044** 0.046***
Previous Protests (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 805 801 801 807 803 803 807 803 803
pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.108 0.109 0.006 0.109 0.110 0.026 0.122 0.123
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each regression
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Table 3: Presence of Severe Protest (Probit Coecients)
Dependent Variable: Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of reschedulings
0.099 0.007
(0.148) (0.115)
Constraint on Executive
0.032 -0.033
(0.035) (0.041)
# of reschedulings* 0.024
Constraint on Executive (0.050)
Political Rights
-0.023 -0.056
(0.053) (0.052)
# of reschedulings* 0.048*
Political Rights (0.027)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)
-0.246 -0.093
(0.152) (0.076)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)* 0.085**
Constraint on Executive (0.035)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)* 0.061**
Political Rights (0.024)
Urbanization Rate
0.959 1.013 1.032 1.065
(0.649) (0.778) (0.809) (0.857)
Log of Real GDP
-0.294* -0.323* -0.312* -0.341*
(0.150) (0.168) (0.167) (0.179)
Religious Fractionalization
0.740 0.754 0.760 0.741
(0.587) (0.581) (0.543) (0.523)
Log of Population
0.183 0.195 0.191 0.198
(0.138) (0.130) (0.134) (0.127)
Number of Previous Protests
0.029 0.017 0.017 0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 705 690 690
pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.122 0.123 0.118
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant term included in each regression
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Table 4: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Constraint on H0 : (1) = (7)
Executive = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (p-value)
# of reschedulings = 0 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.409
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.088** 0.101* 0.317
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.028] [0.040] [0.055]
# of reschedulings = 0 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.438
(over 2 years) [0.012] [0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.000
(over 2 years) [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.064*** 0.083*** 0.106*** 0.000
(over 2 years) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.016] [0.023]
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 1 of Table 3 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 3 of Table 3
Table 5: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
H0 : (1) = (7)
Political Rights = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (p-value)
# of reschedulings = 0 0.037** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.679
[0.017] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.367
[0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.047** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.096*** 0.109*** 0.025
[0.019] [0.021] [0.023] [0.026] [0.030] [0.034] [0.040]
# of reschedulings = 0 0.048** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.327
(over 2 years) [0.020] [0.013] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.887
(over 2 years) [0.015] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.021
(over 2 years) [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.016] [0.020]
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 2 of Table 3 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 4 of Table 3
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